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Having Failed to Defend, an Insurer Can
Still Argue Lack of Coverage
Royal Insurance Co. ofAmerica v. Kirksville College
of OsteopathicMedicine, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
When an insurer breaches its contract with an insured party by failing to
defend against a claim that could possibly be covered under the policy, the
insurer loses several of the rights it otherwise would have enjoyed.2 Among the
rights it loses, however, is not the right to contend in court that the claim was not
covered under the terms of the policy.' The duty to defend and the duty to
indemnify constitute distinct issues, subject to separate trial and independent
determination.4 Such, at least, was the implication of Missouri holdings that
drew near to addressing the question.'
In recent insurance disputes, however, litigants have attempted to argue that
insurance companies in breach of the duty to defend should be entirely precluded
from litigating the issue of indemnity and required to pay all losses incurred or
settlements reached by insured parties.6 In Royal Insurance Co. of America v.

Kirksville College of OsteopathicMedicine, Inc., the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals specifically addressed this argument and held that insurers still have the
right to be heard on the coverage issue.7
This Note explores the consequences of an insurer's breach of the duty to
defend under Missouri case law. It also examines the theories applied in other
states in support of the position that a breach of the duty to defend entails loss of
the right to argue lack of coverage. The Note concludes that the holding in
Royal resolved a burgeoning controversy by clarifying insurers' rights to an
extent unknown in other jurisdictions.
IX. FACTS AND HOLDING
The parties between whom the conflict in Royal first arose, Lewistown Heet

Gas Company and Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, owned adjoining

1. 304 F.3d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 2002).
2. Whitehead v. Lakeside Hosp. Ass'n, 844 S.W.2d 475,481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
3. Royal, 304 F.3d at 807.
4. See Butters v. City of Independence, 513 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Mo. 1974).
5. See, e.g., Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.
1999); Butters, 513 S.W.2d at 425.
6. See Royal, 304 F.3d at 807; Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 266 F.3d 859,
863-64 (8th Cir. 2001).
7. Royal, 304 F.3d at 807.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 8

1002

MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 68

properties! Lewistown entered into a contract to sell some of its land to
Kirksville College for use as a parking lot.9 Because the land had formerly been
the location of a coal gasification plant,' ° coal tar wastes were held in storage
containers under the land." Before the date of closing, a contractor hired by the
college began constructing the parking lot, 2 and in the course of its work the
contractor burst an underground storage tank that held coal tar wastes, causing
a release of contaminants." Lewistown
brought negligence and trespass claims
14
against the college and its contractor.
Royal, Kirksville College's insurer, initially defended the college under a
reservation of rights," but the insurance company withdrew its defense' 6 when
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that it
had no duty to defend the college because of a clause in the comprehensive
general liability policies absolutely excluding coverage for pollution claims. 7
The withdrawal proved to be premature: on appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that
the exclusion applied to the negligence claim but not to the trespass claim, so the
duty to defend on the trespass claim remained. 8

8. Id. at 805. See generally Breach of Duty to Defend Does Not Bar Later

Litigation ofIndemnity Issue: Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kirksville Coll. of Osteopathic
Med., 23 No. 6 ANDREWS HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIG. REP. 13 (2002).

9. Royal, 304 F.3d at 806.
10. Id.

11. Coal gas is produced at gasification plants using a carbureted water gas process.
By reacting coal or coke with steam, a gas rich in hydrogen and carbon monoxide is
produced, which is called coal gas. Adding petroleum oils to the coal gas increases its
heating value. By means of a carburetion process, the coal gas is then thermally broken
down into gaseous constituents. The resulting product is known as carbureted water gas.
In these operations, coal tar sludge, iron oxide wastes, and associated coal gasification
wastes are generated. The tar sludge is usually deposited in on-site pits, drainage ditches,
or underground storage containers. See Public Health Assessment, Fairfield Coal
Gasification Plant, Fairfield, Jefferson County, Iowa, available at
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/PHA/fair/fcg_pl.html.
12. Royal, 304 F.3d at 806.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. When coverage is in doubt, the insurer may offer to defend the insured
under a reservation of rights agreement. In such an agreement, the insurer reserves to
itself all of its policy defenses in case the insured is found liable. A reservation of rights
is thus a means by which the insurer seeks to suspend the operation of estoppel through
a non-waiver agreement prior to determination of the liability of the insured. See Apex
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Christner, 240 N.E.2d 742, 747 (fI1. App. Ct. 1968).
16. Royal, 304 F.3d at 806.
17. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kirksville Coll. of Osteopathic Med., Inc., 191 F.3d
959, 960 (8th Cir. 1999).
18. Id. at 964.
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Lewistown's claims against Kirksville College and the contractor were
eventually settled.' 9 The state court that heard the action had granted summary
judgment for the contractor, holding that the contractor had implied permission
to work on the site and thus no trespass had occurred.2 ° Meanwhile, Lewistown
and Kirksville College reached a settlement in which the college agreed to
complete its purchase of the property for $30,000, pay damages of $270,000 for
the reduction in value to the property, and to assume responsibility for any
environmental remediation.2" The three parties to the state action (Royal having
already withdrawn) then agreed to stipulate to a dismissal of all claims with
prejudice.22
Although Royal settled with the college for the failure to defend,23 Royal
continued to argue that it was not required by the insurance policies to indemnify
the college for claims arising from this type of incident.2 Rather, the college
contended that not only was the insurance company required to provide a
defense, but it should also be punished for its failure to litigate by being
prohibited from arguing it had no duty to indemnify.25 The district court agreed
with Royal and granted summary judgment in its favor. First, the court held,
Royal's duty to indemnify only extended to the claim for trespass, and thus not
to the damages arising under the negligence claim. Second, the college was
collaterally estopped from claiming damages for the trespass by the state court's
ruling that the contractor had implied permission to work at the site.26
The district court's decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit.1 Judge
Loken found that by failing to defend the lawsuit, Royal lost its ability to reject
what it might consider an unfavorable settlement reached by the insured party
without Royal's input.28 Royal, however, was entitled to litigate the issue of
indemnity,29 that is, whether the policies required compensation for such claims
in the first place. Thus, the court of appeals expressly established the rule of law
that when an insurer breaches its duty to defend an insured party, the insurer is
not prohibited from contesting whether it must indemnify the insured under the
terms of the policy. 0

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Royal, 304 F.3d at 806.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 805-06.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 806-07.
Id. at 807.
Id.
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IH. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Fundamental to the holding in this case is the established principle that
when an insurer breaches its duty to defend, it loses the ability to contest any
settlement reached by the insured acting on its own behalf.3 In effect, therefore,
the breach releases the insured party from any contractual obligation not to settle,
and the insured may proceed to obtain the best settlement it can while retaining
the right to be compensated by the insurer.32 The insurer generally need only
provide compensation for those portions of the settlement obligation that are
actually covered by the liability policy."
The risks that face an insurer declining to defend against third party claims
are explored in Whitehead v. Lakeside HospitalAss 'n, 3' a case relied on by the
Royal court. In Whitehead, the parents of a child who suffered brain damage at
birth brought a malpractice claim against Lakeside Hospital in February of
1989. 3" The hospital's insurance policy, however, required that in order for
coverage to apply, the claim had to be filed during the coverage period,
essentially the calendar year 1987.36 The insurance company denied coverage
but provided a defense under a reservation of rights.37 The company thereafter
repeatedly sought to intervene to stay proceedings while a petition was pending
for declaratory judgment that the claims were not covered by the policy.3"
In upholding the lower court's denial of the insurer's petitions to intervene,
the court held that, on the one hand, an insurer cannot insist on controlling the
defense in a case and at the same time reserve the right to disclaim coverage.39
On the other hand, the court explained, an insurer exposes itself to certain risks
by refusing to defend in full on the ground that the claim is outside the coverage
of the policy.4" If the claim is not covered under the policy, the insurer avoids
liability, but if the claim falls within the policy coverage, the refusal of the
insurer to defend the insured is unjustified and the insurer has breached its
contract. 4 ' The consequences of such a breach include the loss of the right to

31. Id. at 806-07; see also Whitehead v. Lakeside Hosp. Ass'n, 844 S.W.2d 475,

480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Cologna v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 785 S.W.2d 691,
701 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).

32. Whitehead, 844 S.W.2d at 480.
33. Royal, 304 F.3d at 806-07.
34. See Whitehead, 844 S.W.2d at 481.
35. Id. at 477.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 480.
40. Id. at481.
41. Id. The legal losses of rights suffered by the insurer upon unjustifiablyrefusing

to defend are classed in four categories: (1)the insurer takes on new positive obligations;
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demand that the insured comply with certain contractual provisions, including
the contractual obligation not to settle.42 The insured therefore may proceed to
settlement and achieve a reasonable compromise while retaining its ability to
receive compensation from the insurer. 3
In light of the burdens imposed by these risks and compromised rights,
Missouri courts have described the insurer's duty to defend as one that is more
broad than the duty to indemnify." The duty to defend is broader because it
arises whenever there is merely a possibility of liability under the facts as known
at the outset of the case in their widest applications, while the duty to indemnify
45
is limited to actual obligations under the more narrow terms of the contract.
This approach can be explained on the grounds that the duty to defend would be
a "hollow promise" if the insured were required first to prove that the claim
would be covered before receiving a defense against the claim." It is, after all,
at trial that the determination is made whether the claim is valid, and when
coverage is disputed, whether the policy covers it.
The Missouri Supreme Court recently clarified this principle inMcCormack
Baron Management Services, Inc. v. American Guarantee and Liability
Insurance Co. 47 In McCormack, a security guard complained to his supervisor
that a new employee of the security service often missed work or came to work
intoxicated. 4' The supervisor showed the letter to the property manager of the
housing project that engaged the security service, and the property manager
responded that the security guard's complaint amounted to insubordination.4 9
When the security guard was fired from his job, he sued the property
management company for tortious interference with a contractual relationship
based on the property manager's remarks, claiming that his loss of employment

(2) the insurer loses some positive rights previously enjoyed, such as the right to control

the defense; (3) the insurer loses the right to demand compliance by the insured with
certain prohibitory provisions in the policy; and (4) the insurer loses the right to demand
compliance by the insured with certain affirmative provisions in the policy. Id.; see also
4 LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 51:44-51:67, at 51-78-51-116 (3d ed. 1996).
42. Whitehead, 844 S.W.2d at 480.

43. Id.
44. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kirksville Coll. of Osteopathic Med., Inc., 304 F.3d

804, 808 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 966,
969 (8th Cir. 1999); McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab.
Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Mo. 1999); cf Butters v. City of Independence, 513
S.W.2d 418,424 (1974).

45. McCormack, 989 S.W.2d at 170.
46. Id. (citing 13 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND

PRACTICE § 4684 (1976)).
47. Id. at 173-74.

48. Id. at 169.
49. Id.
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was a direct result of those statements."0 The issue, then, was whether the
property management company's insurance policy, which covered damages
resulting from personal injury, covered this claim when the definition of personal
injury included such "offenses" as "injury, other than 'bodily injury,' arising out
of... [o]ral or written publication of material that slanders or ... disparages a
person's ... services."'"
American Guarantee, the property management company's insurer, denied
coverage and refused to provide a defense.52 At trial, the insurer took the
position that because the term "disparages" was used in the policy under the
heading of "offenses," the policy only covered the cause of action of
"disparagement" or "injurious falsehood," and did not cover the tortious
interference claim.53 While the claim against the insurer for failure to indemnify
was not decided by the court because it was not ripe for judgment at the time of
trial, the court was nonetheless able to hold that the insurer had a duty to defend
against the claim.54 Applying the meaning of "disparage" as it would be used by
an ordinary person of average understanding, the court found that the manager's
comments had certainly disparaged the guard's services."5 Since the term
"offense" did not limit the policy to any particular cause of action 6 the court
held that at least the possibility for a valid claim was present, and the insurer thus
had a duty to defend." "If the complaint merely alleges facts that give rise to a
claim potentially within the policy's coverage," the court held, "the insurer has
a duty to defend." 8
In previous Missouri case law, however, breaching the duty to defend had
not necessarily resulted in the insurer's loss of its right to dispute coverage. 9
Earlier Missouri cases demonstrate that it is at least possible that an insurer may
be allowed to argue the issue of coverage despite having failed to defend the
insured.60 Butters v. City of Independence,6 ' for example, involved claims
arising from an injury sustained when a crane operator allowed a crane to come
in contact with high voltage power lines, causing severe electrical shock to an

50. Id.
51. Id. at 170.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 171.
54. Id. at 174.
55. Id. at 171.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 174.
58. Id. at 170-71 (citing Butters v. City of Independence, 513 S.W.2d 418, 424
(Mo. 1974)).
59. See generally Whitehead v. Lakeside Hosp. Ass'n, 844 S.W.2d 475, 480-81
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
60. See, e.g., Butters, 513 S.W.2d at 425.
61. Id.
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employee on the ground.6' The insurer insisted on defending the claim under a
reservation of rights-a demand deemed unacceptable by the municipal policy
holder.6 3 The claim had gone to trial even as the insurance company still refused
to defend unless its rights were reserved.64 The trial court determined that such
behavior amounted to a breach of the duty to defend, 6 and treated the coverage
issue summarily, holding that the claims were covered." The court of appeals
ultimately reversed, holding that the insurer should have been allowed a
hearing. 67 The consequences of the breach specifically included loss of the
insurer's right to control the defense and the release of the insured from the
prohibition against incurring expenses and settling claims, but the question of
coverage was appropriate for remand."'
The holding in Butters thus implied that the two kinds of duties, to defend
and to indemnify, are distinct and separately triable. 69 This principle was also
stated in the abstract in Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,7" which

served as a primary precedent in support of the holding in Royal.71 In Esicorp,
welded steel pipe sections shipped from St. Louis for use in a California
construction project were negligently inspected.72 The construction contractor
sued the inspection firm when it became apparent after the pipes were in place
that the welding along the length of the pipes contained rejectable defects.73 As
the insured party, the inspection firm took advantage of its right under a Missouri
statute to agree separately with the plaintiff that the plaintiff would only collect
any settlement obligation or damages from the insurer.74 The insurer, however,
denied coverage and refused to provide a defense against the claim because, in
its view, the defective welding did not constitute "property damage" under the
terms of the policy.7"

62. Id. at 420-21.
63. Id. at 421-22.
64. Id. at 424.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id.

69. See generally id. See also Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 966,
969 (8th Cir. 1999).
70. Esicorp, 193 F.3d at 969.

71. See Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kirksville Coll. of Osteopathic Med., Inc., 304
F.3d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 2002).
72. Esicorp, 193 F.3d at 968.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.065 (2001); Esicorp,193 F.3d at 971. Note
that the insured parties in Butters and Whiteheadused this same procedure. Butters, 513

S.W.2d at 422; Whitehead v. Lakeside Hosp. Ass'n, 844 S.W.2d 475,477 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992).
75. Esicorp, 193 F.3d at 969.
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The court held that under the broad scope of the duty to defend, the faulty
welding on the pipes could potentially fall within the policy's coverage of
"property damage," and the insurer therefore was in breach.76 The court
emphasized that because the duty to defend is a contractual obligation, damages
such as paying the insured's cost of defending the underlying action must flow
from the breach." By failing to defend, however, the insurer had lost the rights
to control the defense and contest the settlement, unless the insured and the
plaintiff reached the settlement in collusion or bad faith.78 The crucial issue
addressed by the court, in light of the development of case law with regard to
breaching the duty to defend, was whether such a breach creates insurer liability
for portions of the settlement not in fact attributable to claims covered under the
policy.79 If claims not otherwise covered under the policy could be charged to
the insurer as part of a settlement agreement, the mere failure to defend the
insured party would have the effect of substantially expanding the insurer's duty
to indemnify. 80
Citing Butters, the court held that no such expansion of the duty to
indemnify resulted."' This conclusion in part was based on an inference deduced
from the Butters court's decision to grant the insurer in that case a trial on the
issue of coverage. 2 According to the court, Missouri law required that when an
insured reached a settlement with a plaintiff, the settlement should be analyzed
to discover whether the underlying claims actually qualified under the policy,
since the insurer's liability could not exceed the policy's scope.83
Indeed, subsequent events in the Esicorplitigation reveal that in practice,
the duty to defend may exist when the duty to indemnify is entirely absent.8 4 On
remand, the district court held that the claims for negligent inspection of the
welding constituted "property damage" and were covered under the policy's
terms. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that most of the damages
could not be classified as "property damage" at all and therefore were not
covered by the policy in the first place.8" Thus, although a potential claim had
existed and the insurance company had a duty to defend against it, 86 Ultimately
the company's initial determination that the claim was not covered proved to be

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 970.
Id.
Id.

Id.
See id. at 970-71.
Id.
Id. at 971.
Id.
See Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 266 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Esicorp, 193 F.3d at 970.
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substantially correct and there was no duty to indemnify the main body of the
claims addressed in the settlement.87
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Royal, the court found that the insured, Kirksville College, was entitled
to settle with the plaintiff, Lewistown, because the college's insurer, Royal, had
breached its duty to defend.88 It noted the college's contention that Royal should
be punished for its refusal to defend by being precluded from litigating the issue
of indemnity under the policy.89 The court emphasized that this issue was highly
significant because the duty to defend arises when there is only a potential for
coverage.9" But the court found that only one of the claims asserted against the
college was actually covered.9 The majority held, as in the Esicorpdecisions,92
that a settlement incorporating multiple claims must be analyzed to determine
whether each of the claims it covers qualifies for indemnity, and the insurer is
only liable to pay the portion attributable to the qualifying claims.93 The court
therefore concluded that despite having breached its duty to defend, an insurer
is not only permitted but is entitled to a trial of the indemnity issue.94
In a partial dissent, Judge Bye concurred that Royal had breached its duty
to defend the college.9 5 He also agreed that Royal was entitled to apportionment
of the settlement between covered and non-covered claims.9" Judge Bye
dissented, however, from the majority's position that the college was collaterally
estopped from claiming indemnity for the trespass claim, which the lower court
held was covered by the policy.97 Although the state court held that no trespass
had occurred, this determination was not made known to the parties until after
they had entered a settlement agreement in which the trespass claim had almost
certainly been a factor.98 The judge noted that the college entered this settlement

87. Esicorp, 266 F.3d at 863. The court did hold that there was damage to the
epoxy coating in the pipes that could be labeled "property damage" and attributed to the
insured's negligence. Id. at 863. The value of this covered claim, however, was $11,298,
id., approximately one-third of one percent of the total damages sought, $3,046,709.
88. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kirksville Coll. of Osteopathic Med., Inc., 304 F.3d
804, 806 (8th Cir. 2002).
89. Id. at 806-07.
90. Id. at 807.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 809 (Bye, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
Id. (Bye, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
Id. (Bye, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
Id. (Bye, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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after being unjustifiably abandoned by Royal. 9 Judge Bye therefore concluded
that in determining the insurer's duty to indemnify the court should focus on the
status of the claim at the time of settlement.'00
V. COMMENT
Royal at last clearly stated in general terms a principle that had been
approached, and in some cases was implicit, in previous Missouri holdings: that
a breach of the duty to defend cannot alone deprive an insurer of its right to a
trial on the issue of coverage under the policy.'0 ' The case therefore serves as
a capstone in the line of Missouri cases relating to the consequences of breach
of the duty to defend, and brings Missouri insurance law one step ahead of other
jurisdictions in clarity on the subject of insurers' rights.
The McCormack case summarized the law concerning when a duty to
defend arises, but did not reach the issue of indemnity.'02 Likewise, Esicorpheld
that despite having breached its duty to defend, the insurer in that case was
required to compensate the insured for very little of the damages actually claimed
since only a small fraction was actually covered by the policy. 3 But in failing
to declare the general principle that an unjustified refusal to defend does not
result in loss of the right to litigate indemnity, these cases left open the
possibility that future parties would assert that a loss of the right to argue against
indemnity could be applied as a penalty. By stating the principle outright, the
Royal decision is likely to curtail such punitive arguments.
Punitive arguments are not without support in the case law of other
jurisdictions, however.'0 4 Some courts have employed contract law theory to
expand an insurer's liability upon breach of the duty to defend to cover even
losses outside the policies. These courts have held that an insurer is liable to pay
the full amount of a settlement or judgment against the insured when the
settlement or judgment is reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the
breach.'0 5 For example, in Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co., 0 6 an insurer was
held liable for a default judgment entered against the insured. Although in
Amato the final analysis revealed that the claims were in fact not covered by the

99. Id. (Bye, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
100. Id. (Bye, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
101. Id. at 807.
102. McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Am. Guarantee &Liab. Ins. Co., 989
S.W.2d 168, 173 (Mo. 1999).
103. Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 266 F.3d 859, 863-64 (8th Cir. 2001).
104. See generally PHIL L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND

O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11:24 (2002).

105. See id.; Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Amato
v. Mercury Cas. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
106. Amato, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909.
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policy, the default judgment would not have been entered if the insurer had
defended."7

Other courts have found full liability in tort or under equitable principles.'°8
Kansas courts have held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel could be applied
to prohibit an insurer's use of a coverage defense.0 9 The courts in that state
stopped short, however, of creating a bright-line rule that insurers who reserve
their rights or fail to provide a defense are always equitably estopped from
raising a defense based on coverage." 0 According to the court inAselco, Inc. v.
Hartford Insurance Group, such an approach has been adopted by only a
minority of jurisdictions, in part because of the "potential of creating coverage
where none [existed].""' Thus, although the court found that there may be
sound public policy grounds for holding that the insurer could no longer try the
indemnity issue,"' the Kansas court left the matter unresolved. It held that in
light of previous Kansas cases where the indemnity issue was disputed even after
breach of the duty to defend, there was no basis for finding that Kansas law
denied an insurer its right to argue against coverage.'13
Illinois courts do not hesitate to apply the doctrine of estoppel." 4
Presumably to prevent abuse and ensure that parties perform their obligations
under policy contracts, Illinois law requires that when coverage is uncertain an
insurer must provide a defense. The insurer may choose between reserving its
rights or pursuing a simultaneous action seeking a declaratory judgment that
there is no coverage." 5 If it fails to act on either of these alternatives, the insurer
will be estopped from raising any defense on the basis of coverage under the
policy , 6

Interpreting California law, the Ninth Circuit has held that under a wellestablished general rule "an insurer that wrongfully refuses to defend is liable on

107. Id. at 911.
108. BRUNER & O'CONNOR, JR., supra note 104, § 11:24.
109. See Aselco, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 21 P.3d 1011, 1020 (Kan. Ct. App.
2001). The court in Aselco described three possible consequences for breach of the duty
to defend, but chose not to endorse the third. The three consequences are: (1) an insurer
could be held liable for damages in excess of the stated policy limits, (2) collateral
estoppel could prevent the insurer from litigating issues that were litigated and
determined in the underlying action, and (3) equitable estoppel could prevent the insurer
from raising any defense of lack of coverage. Id. at 1019-20.
110. Id. at 1020.
111. Id.

112.
113.
114.
2001).
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Korte Constr. Co. v. Am. States Ins., 750 N.E.2d 764, 769-70 (Il. App. Ct.
State Farm Fire &Cas. Co. v. Martin, 710 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (II1. 1999).
Id.
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the judgment against the insured.""' 7 An insurer could not validly assert the
defense that ultimate judgment was not rendered on a theory within the coverage
of the insurance policy." 8 If the insurer were permitted to argue that the
judgment would have been smaller had the insurer not failed to defend, an
impossible burden would be imposed on the insured to prove the extent of the
loss incurred by the insurer's breach." 9
In Missouri case law as well, estoppel has long been the preferred theory in
the hands of the insured when the insurer, by inordinate delay or utter refusal to
defend, breaches its duty yet attempts to argue the indemnity issue. 20 Arguably
then, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel can under some circumstances still be
used in Missouri to create coverage that did not previously exist. 2 ' To invoke
the rule of waiver, the Missouri Supreme Court in Brown v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile InsuranceCo. required nothing more than a showing of prejudice.'22
In the absence of prejudice, a showing either that the insurer expressly waived
the immunity or engaged in conduct that clearly and unequivocally showed an
intention to waive the contractual right would accomplish the same purpose.'
Abandonment of the insured in the face of a claim might alone satisfy the
prejudice requirement of such a test.
The partial dissenting opinion by Judge Bye also would expand insurers'
liability to cover claims that are foreign to the terms of their policies, if perhaps
not to the extent of requiring full liability. 24 Judge Bye would only impose this
requirement when abandonment by the insurer caused the insured to enter into
a settlement that included a non-covered claim. 2 Still, this position has the
potential of greatly expanding insurer liability without so much as a hearing on
the issue of coverage.

117. Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d
895, 901 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 179 (Cal.
1966)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 902.
120. Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883, 891-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
See generally Jeremy P. Drummond, Note, When Will the Smoke Clear?: Application
of Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law, 66 Mo. L. REV. 225 (2001).
121. See Drummond, supranote 120, at 245.
122. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Mo. 1989);
see Drummond, supra note 120, at 245-46.
123. Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 388. Although waiver and estoppel theoretically can
create coverage in Missouri where none existed under policy terms, the burdens of proof
for waiver and estoppel are almost impossible to satisfy in practice. Drummond, supra
note 120, at 245-46.
124. See Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kirksville Coll. of Osteopathic Med., Inc., 304
F.3d 804, 809 (8th Cir. 2002).
125. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the waiver and estoppel approaches and the views of Judge Bye,
the majority position in Royal tends to reject the imposition of coverage liability
where none existed under the applicable policy. In this way, the decision is more
26
in harmony with the trend established in the earlier Missouri cases, Butters,
Whitehead,'27 and Esicorp, 8 and the predominant position among the states.
Because earlier holdings had established that the duty to defend and to indemnify
are in fact separate,' 29 logic dictates that the analysis for each should be separate
at trial. Thus, the holding in Royal constitutes a culmination of previous
decisions in which questions of indemnity were remanded for consideration
despite an insurer's breach of the duty to defend. Just as under Kansas insurance
law the right to litigate indemnity in these circumstances had been established
by implication, but not yet resolved as a matter of certainty,'30 Missouri case law
before Royal contained a troublesome ambiguity. In this decision, an insurer's
right to litigate issues of indemnity in Missouri became much more certain
through a clear statement of a fundamental principle embracing a majority
position. 3 '
MATTHEW

126.
127.
1992).
128.
129.
130.
131.

TOWNS

Butters v. City of Independence, 513 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Mo. 1974).
Whitehead v. Lakeside Hosp. Ass'n, 844 S.W.2d 475, 481 (Mo. Ct. App.
Esicorp, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 966, 863-64 (8th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 969.
Aselco, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 21 P.3d 1011, 1020 (2001).
Id.
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